Volume 48
Issue 1 Winter
Winter 2018

Entering a Building Without Going Inside: The Implications of
State v. Holt for Breaking and Entering Cases in New Mexico
Keri Rezac Thiel
University of New Mexico

Recommended Citation
Keri Rezac Thiel, Entering a Building Without Going Inside: The Implications of State v. Holt for Breaking
and Entering Cases in New Mexico, 48 N.M. L. Rev. 210 (2018).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol48/iss1/8

This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For
more information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

ENTERING A BUILDING WITHOUT GOING
INSIDE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF STATE V. HOLT
FOR BREAKING AND ENTERING CASES IN NEW
MEXICO
Keri Rezac Thiel*

INTRODUCTION
“Entry” is often defined colloquially as to ‘step foot’ in a place. In modern
jurisprudence, however, not even a single foot may be necessary. In State v. Holt,
the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that the defendant’s fingers curved around a
window screen constituted “entry” into a dwelling in violation of the State’s breaking
and entering statute.1 By doing so, the Court broadened the definition of “entry,”
ruling that any breach of an “enclosed, private, prohibited space” is sufficient to be
considered entry into a dwelling for the purposes of breaking and entering.2
The expansion of this definition allows the offense of breaking and entering
to subsume attempted breaking and entering in instances when the defendant has
breached an external boundary, but has not fully gone inside the structure. In effect,
this expansion changes the act of attempted breaking and entering from a
misdemeanor offense to a felony.
Part one of this paper explores the history and evolution of breaking and
entering at common law and in New Mexico in an attempt to better understand the
policy and intent behind the breaking and entering statute. The offense of “breaking
and entering” evolved out of common law burglary and serves the same purpose as
burglary statutes: to deter and punish crimes against property. Breaking and entering
is a lesser form of burglary, requiring that fewer elements be proven and providing
lighter punishments for intruders. Unlike the offense of burglary, breaking and
entering does not require that the intruder committed or intended to commit any
offense within the property. Instead, the breaking and entering statute requires only
that the defendant entered the property by fraud, deception, or breaking.3 Breaking
and entering existed as a standalone offense in New Mexico from 18764 until it was
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1. State v. Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, ¶ 23, 368 P.3d 409.
2. Id. ¶ 18.
3. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-14-8 (West 2016).
4. Act of Jan. 14, 1876, ch. 9, 1876 Acts of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of New
Mexico, Twenty-second Session 40 (codified 1897) (repealed 1963).
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repealed in 1963 as part of a comprehensive reform of the criminal code.5 A new
breaking and entering statute was enacted in 19816 to remedy a loophole that allowed
defendants who committed burglary to escape the charges by virtue of intoxication
or other mental incapacity.7 This paper looks at what this history reveals about the
policy and intent behind the breaking and entering statute.
Part two of this paper considers whether the definition of entry introduced
in Holt is consistent with policy considerations, existing precedent, and the
legislative intent behind enacting both the “breaking and entering” and “attempt”
statutes. The policy considerations underlying the breaking and entering statute are
drawn from common law burglary and include the avoidance of violent
confrontation, the protection of the owner’s right to exclusive possession, and the
preservation of safety and security inside private homes.8 At face value, a more
expansive definition of entry seems to be justified by these objectives. However, this
paper also evaluates the definition of entry introduced in Holt in light of legislative
intent and examines how the new definition fits with existing precedent. It explores
the practical implications of the new definition; the potential for absurd results; and
the judicial creation of attempted breaking and entering as a felony offense,
superseding the Legislature’s designation of attempted fourth degree felonies as
misdemeanors.9
In concluding this analysis, part three of this paper surveys and assesses
how entry is defined nationwide in the United States to determine whether public
policy and legislative intent in New Mexico would be better served by adopting a
different definition of entry.
PART ONE: BACKGROUND
The State of Breaking and Entering at Common Law
“Breaking and entering” has been used as shorthand for burglary for so long
that the two terms have become virtually interchangeable.10 However, “breaking and
entering” is not a stand-alone offense at common law. Rather, “breaking” and
“entering” are two of the traditional elements of burglary. The common law burglary
definition includes the following six elements: (1) breaking and (2) entering (3) a
dwelling house (4) of another (5) in the nighttime (6) with the intent to commit a
5. Act of Mar. 25, 1963, ch. 303, 1963 Laws of the State of New Mexico 822.
6. Act of Mar. 20, 1981, ch. 34, 1981 New Mexico Laws 114.
7. See UJI 14-1410 NMRA (Committee Commentary) (stating that “the 1980 case, State v. Ruiz . . .
pointed out the need for a law making it an offense to break and enter where there is no intent to commit
a felony or theft, or where, because of some impairment, it was impossible for the defendant to form the
requisite intent to commit a felony or theft”).
8. See State v. Office of the Public Defender ex rel. Muqqddin, 2012-NMSC-029, 285 P.3d 622;
U.S. v. Maldonado, 696 F.3d 1095, 1103–04 (10th Cir. 2012).
9. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-28-1 (West 2016).
10. See Matthews v. State, 741 P.2d 370, 373 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (“At common law, burglary
involved a forced breach of the security of the place entered. . . . [t]hus, in common parlance, burglary
came to be known as ‘breaking and entering.’”); Breaking and entering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014) (directing the reader to the entry for burglary); see also John Arnold, Report: More Homicides
in 1980, But Fewer Rapes, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 21, 1981, at C-2 (using burglary and breaking and
entering interchangeably when discussing crime statistics).
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felony within.11 These elements find their roots in Sir Edward Coke’s seventeenth
century definition of burglary,12 and the offense of burglary has existed in the United
States for hundreds of years.13 The definitions of the elements “breaking” and
“entering” for common law burglary have traditionally been identical to the
definitions of “breaking” and “entering” in New Mexico’s standalone breaking and
entering statute.
Courts have long grappled with the individual elements of burglary just as
the New Mexico Supreme Court did with the “entering” element of breaking and
entering in State v. Holt. Since the dawn of “burglary” as a common law offense,
courts have struggled to determine whether a house is still a “dwelling house” when
no one is living there,14 whether it is “nighttime” at dusk,15 and what constitutes a
“breaking.”16 Of these questions, the quest to define a “breaking” is the most
analogous to the query of “what is entry?” that the New Mexico Supreme Court
answered in Holt. The resulting expansion of the definition of entry in New Mexico
can be compared to the historical expansion of the “breaking” element of burglary.

11. State v. Office of the Public Defender ex rel. Muqqddin, 2012-NMSC-029, ¶ 15, 285 P.3d 622;
MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
12. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 63
(London, W. Clarke & Sons 1809) (1644).
13. See The Book of the General Lauues and Libertyes Concerning the Inhabitants of the
Massachusets 4–5 (1648) (stating that “if any person shall commit Burglarie by breaking up any dwelling
house, . . . such a person so offending shall for the first offence be branded on the forehead with the letter
(B) If he shall offend in the same kinde the second time, he shall be branded as before and also be severally
whipped: and if he shall fall into the like offence the third time he shall be put to death, as being
incorrigible”); Helen A. Anderson, From the Thief in the Night to the Guest Who Stayed Too Long: The
Evolution of Burglary in the Shadow of the Common Law, 45 IND. L. REV. 629, 634 (2012) (citing
Theodore E. Lauer, Burglary in Wyoming, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 721, 721 (1997)).
14. See Evans v. State, 41 So. 2d 615, 618 (ALASKA CT. APP. 1949) (holding that “an inhabited
dwelling house within the meaning of the burglary statutes is a dwelling house occupied on the occasion
of the burglary by some person lodged therein in the nighttime. An uninhabited dwelling house would
include all other dwellings which are habitations, but not occupied at the time of the burglary.”); State v.
Lisiewski, 252 N.E.2d 168, 170 (Ohio 1969) (holding that a home is still occupied if the owner intends to
return there at any point in the future).
15. See Sodekson v. Lynch, 49 N.E.2d 901, 903 (Mass. 1943) (stating that “night time shall be
deemed the time between one hour after sunset on one day and one hour before sunrise on the next
day. . . .”); State v. Stuttler, 175 N.E.2d 728, 730 (Ohio 1961) (stating that nighttime is “that period of
time from the setting of the sun in the evening to the rising of the sun in the morning, when the face of
man is no longer discernible.”); Laws v. State, 10 S.W. 220, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1888) (stating that
daytime, for the purposes of a burglary charge, extended from thirty minutes after sunrise until thirty
minutes after sunset).
16. See Cole v. State, 272 A.2d 339, 340 (Del. 1970) (holding that entry through a previously broken
window in a locked frame was not a breaking because the window was not “as much closed as the nature
of things will permit,” since it was not boarded-up (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*221, *226)); Jenkins v. State, 34 N.E.3d 258, 261–62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that use of force
against a victim is sufficient to constitute a breaking); Davis v. State, 910 So. 2d 1228, 1231 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2005) (“It is well-established in Mississippi that a breaking is conducted by an act of force, regardless
of how slight, necessary to be used in entering a building, such as turning a knob, a slight push to further
open a door, or raising a latch.” (citing Gross v. State, 2 So. 2d 818 (Miss. 1941))); Morgan v. State, 507
S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (holding that when a defendant entered through a small space
just large enough to “squeeze through,” a breaking could be found “by virtue of entry having been made
at an unusual place”).
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Over the course of decades, lawyers and judges have tried to determine
exactly what constitutes a breaking—and what does not.17 As a result, the definition
of “breaking” has expanded rapidly over the course of its common law history in the
United States, paralleling on a larger scale the current expanse of the definition of
“entering” in New Mexico. The concept of “constructive breaking,” in which one
gains access to a dwelling through fraud or deception without a physical breaking, is
now broadly recognized at common law.18 The opening of an unlocked window or
door is also widely accepted as a “breaking.”19 In other words, the element of
“breaking” evolved to sometimes not involve a breaking at all. “Breaking” grew from
an easily recognizable phenomenon—a shattered window; a busted-in door—to
something that one court determined could be accomplished “by virtue of entry
having been made at an unusual place.”20
In 1980, the commentary to the Model Penal Code opined that the definition
of “breaking” had become so distorted that case law was churning out “absurd
distinctions.”21 In support of this point, it added that “[r]aising a closed window was
a breaking, but raising a partly open one was not; . . . breaking open a cupboard
within a dwelling was not a breaking for the purposes of burglary, whereas entering
a closed room was. . . .”22 In light of the state of common law regarding breaking,
the Commentary remarked that the requirement of a “breaking” in burglary statutes
had become “little more than symbolic.”23

17. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 16.
18. Of the eleven states that have retained “breaking” as an element of burglary, nine have judicially
recognized the concept of constructive breaking: Indiana (Sims v. State, 36 N.E. 278, 278 (Ind. 1894)
(stating that a “breaking may be either actual or constructive”)); Maryland (Brooks v. State, 333 A.2d
352, 354 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (stating that “[it] has been consistently held that where one gains
entrance by trick, fraud, artifice, deception or similar means, one may be said to have constructively
broken.”)); Massachusetts (State v. Labare, 416 N.E.2d 534, 538 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that the
doctrine of constructive breaking has been included in the word “breaks” since the American
Revolution)); Mississippi (Holderfield v. State, 61 So. 2d 385, 386 (Miss. 1952) (stating that a
constructive breaking is “where an entry is effected by fraud or intimidation”)); North Carolina (State v.
Smith, 316 S.E.2d 75, 78 (N.C. 1984) (stating that a constructive breaking occurs “where a burglar gains
an entry into a house by threats, fraud, or conspiracy”)); Oklahoma (Patton v. State, 1998 OK CR 66, ¶
41, 973 P.2d 270 (stating that constructive breaking occurs “when entry is obtained by any other manner,
such as fraud, trick, or threats made while being armed with a dangerous weapon”)); Rhode Island (State
v. Abdullah, 967 A.2d 469, 476 (R.I. 2009) (stating that constructive breaking occurs when “intruder
gained entry to a dwelling without physical force, but by fraud, trick, or threat of force”)); Virginia (Clarke
v. State, 110 S.E. 356, 357 (Va. 1922) (stating that “[t]here is a constructive breaking when an entrance
has been obtained by threat of violence, by fraud, or by conspiracy”)); and West Virginia (State v.
Plumley, 384 S.E.2d 130, 133 (W. Va. 1989) (stating that “consent of the occupant obtained through fraud
or threat of force is not a defense to the crime of burglary”)). One state, Michigan, has not formally
recognized constructive breaking. Only Nebraska has judicially rejected constructive breaking. See
McGrath v. State, 41 N.W. 780, 781 (Neb. 1889) (requiring an actual, and not constructive, breaking).
19. See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 220 N.E.2d 345, 347 (Ind. 1966) (holding that “[o]pening an
unlocked door or raising an unlocked window is sufficient to constitute a ‘breaking’”).
20. Morgan v. State, 507 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
21. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
22. Minturn T. Wright III, Statutory Burglary—The Magic of Four Walls and a Roof, 100 U. PA. L.
REV. 411, 412 (1951).
23. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
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The complex distinctions within the definition of “breaking,” as well as the
other elements of the burglary statute,24 led to increasingly absurd results25 and
eventually led to many states choosing to remove several elements in order to
simplify the statute. Most states no longer require a breaking, or that the offense
occur at night, or at a dwelling house.26 The removal of these elements effectively
increased the prosecutorial reach of burglary statutes by simplifying the requirements
for a burglary charge.27 The trend of simplifying burglary statutes took off in the
mid-twentieth century,28 as reflected in the new definition of burglary proposed in
the Model Penal Code: “enter[ing] a building or occupied structure, or separately
secured or occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit a crime therein. . . .”29
Entry and intent were the only two elements of the common-law six to be
retained by the Code. Entry was the only element to be retained unaltered.30 Today,
the use of “breaking and entering” interchangeably with “burglary” is an
anachronism in most states: only eleven states have kept “breaking” or “breaking
and entering” intact in their definition of burglary,31 while the District of Columbia
has opted to statutorily provide, in alternative, “or enter without breaking.”32

24. See supra notes 13–14.
25. E.g., Wright III, supra note 22, at 413 (“A definition of night as the period between sunset and
sunrise was considered arbitrary and unrealistic, since a man’s countenance could be discerned at dawn
or twilight. Consequently, burglary could only be committed after dark. But such reasoning stopped at
that point since burglary could be committed no matter how bright the moon.”).
26. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:18-2 (West 2015).
27. See Wright III, supra note 22, at 415–20 (1951).
28. See generally Anderson, supra note 13, at 634–41 (2012) (discussing the history of burglary in
the United States up to and including the changes made to the Model Penal Code in 1962).
29. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). The statute continues
only to provide exceptions for premises open to the public and actors who are licensed or privileged to
enter, and to provide an affirmative defense for entry of abandoned property.
30. The Code also altered the specific intent element of burglary to require intent to commit a crime,
abandoning the common law requirement of intent to commit a felony.
31. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-2-1 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 6-202 (West Supp.
2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 15 (West 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.110 (West
Supp. 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-23 (West 2016); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-507 (West Supp.
2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-51 (West 2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1431 (West 2002); 11
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-8-1 (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-89 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 61-3-11 (West 2002). While North Carolina’s statute provides no definition for “burglary,” the element
of “breaking” has been judicially adopted as implicit in the statute. See State v. Shaw, 417 S.E.2d 262
(N.C. Ct. App. 1992). Rhode Island’s statute also does not provide a definition of “burglary,” but its
judiciary has applied the requirements of “breaking and entering.” See State v. Contreras-Cruz, 765 A.2d
849 (N.J. 2001).
32. D.C. CODE § 22-801 (2016).
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Nonetheless, a number of states have chosen to keep “breaking and
entering” alive as a separate offense, despite having excised “breaking” from their
definition of burglary.33 New Mexico is one of these states.34 However, the history
of New Mexico’s breaking and entering statute is not as simple as merely having
moved the “breaking and entering” clause from one statute to another.
The Evolution of New Mexico’s Breaking and Entering Statute
The first breaking and entering statute in New Mexico was enacted on
January 14, 1876.35 While constructively a breaking and entering statute,36 the statute
did not actually contain the phrase “breaking and entering.” The original statute read
as follows:

33. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-202 (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.13 (West Supp. 2011).
Several other states that have removed “breaking” have enacted other statutes with the same constructive
effect as a breaking and entering statute, but without preserving the language “breaking and entering.”
These states are Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 708-810 (West 2008)), Louisiana (LA. STAT. ANN. §
14:62 (2016)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.060 (West 2015)), and Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-3-301 (West Supp. 2013)).
34. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-14-8 (West 2016).
35. Act of Jan. 14, 1876, ch. 9, 1876 Acts of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of New
Mexico, Twenty-second Session 40 (codified 1897) (repealed 1963).
36. See UJI 14-1410 NMRA (Committee Commentary) (referring to the act passed in 1876 as New
Mexico’s first “breaking and entering” statute).
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If any person or persons shall in any manner, enter any house
occupied by any person or persons by breaking or piercing the
wall, or without breaking the same, climb upon any roof or in any
other manner enter any house, without the consent of the occupant
or owner thereof, or having pierced the wall, could not enter by
reason of detection or by reason of any other obstruction, the same
shall be deemed a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof, before
the district court or a justice of the peace, shall be fined in a sum
not less than fifty dollars nor more than one hundred dollars and
imprisoned for thirty days at hard labor.37
As written, this statute required no specific criminal intent and created a
misdemeanor offense. It was included in the 1897 Compiled Laws of New Mexico
as Section 1163: “House breaking and entering,”38 solidifying that the Legislature
intended to treat “breaking and entering” as its own offense outside the scope of
burglary. This breaking and entering statute remained good law in New Mexico for
87 years, despite multiple re-codifications of the criminal code.39
That changed in 1963, when the existing criminal code in New Mexico was
repealed in full and replaced with a new code that did not include a breaking and
entering statute.40 Though legislative history is not available to explain why the
Legislature chose to drop breaking and entering as a separate offense, a look at the
circumstances surrounding the enactment of the new code sheds some light on why
breaking and entering was removed from the criminal code.
The challenging task of creating a new criminal code was undertaken for a
variety of reasons41 with one overriding theme: “to bring unity and order out of a
century’s accumulation of legislation [by] reconciling enactments passed at different
times, by different legislatures, with different conceptions of the purpose of criminal
justice and the seriousness of various crimes.”42 The criminal code in New Mexico
until that point had been compiled piecemeal over the course of more than a
century,43 built upon the original “Kearney Code,” which was enacted in 1846.44 The

37. 1953 New Mexico Statutes Annotated Vol. 6, Ch. 40, Art. 9 (repealed 1963).
38. 1897 Compiled Laws of New Mexico Tit. 9, Ch. 3, § 1163.
39. 1915 New Mexico Statutes Annotated Ch. 26, Art. 13, § 1524 (renaming the statute “Unlawfully
entering house”); 1929 New Mexico Statutes Annotated Ch. 35, § 35-1506; 1941 New Mexico Statutes
Annotated Vol. 3, Ch. 41, Art. 9, § 41-910 (renaming the statute “Entering house without consent—
Breaking with intent to enter—Penalty”); 1953 New Mexico Statutes Annotated Vol. 6, Ch. 40, Art. 9 §
40-9-10.
40. Act of Mar. 25, 1963, ch. 303, 1963 Laws of the State of New Mexico 822.
41. Criminal Code Bill Signed by Campbell, ALBUQUERQUE J., Mar. 26, 1963, at A-2 (stating that
the new criminal code “attempts to clarify existing statutes, weed out duplicating and conflicting
provisions and equalize punishments for crimes of similar severity”).
42. Henry Weihofen, The Proposed New Mexico Criminal Code, 1 NAT. RESOURCES J. 123, 123
(1961).
43. Id. at 125 (stating that the criminal code in New Mexico at that time was “piecemeal legislation
at its worst”).
44. 1953 New Mexico Statutes Annotated Vol. 1, Kearny Code of Laws.
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result was a complex maze of laws, many of which were outdated, obsolete, or
insufficient for 20th century society.45
In 1957, the Legislature formed the Criminal Law Study Committee to
rectify these flaws.46 The Committee was comprised of seven members of the
Legislature, including at least two attorneys.47 A full-time staff assistant was also
hired.48 Together, the Committee decided that writing a new code to replace the old
one would be easier than extensively amending the old code.49 For the next three
years, the Committee carefully compiled the first fourteen articles of what is now the
criminal code.50 However, during the third year, two Committee members left and
were replaced by practicing attorneys with more experience in criminal law, who felt
strongly that the existing criminal code should be left in place and amended rather
than replaced entirely.51
The resulting disagreements led to the resignation of the staff assistant, and
the assignment of an assistant Attorney General to run the Committee.52 Ultimately,
the Committee was unable to work collaboratively to complete its task, and the
incomplete criminal code was handed off to an attorney in Los Alamos.53 Working
over the course of one month, July 1960, that attorney singlehandedly wrote the
remaining seventeen articles of the proposed criminal code, including the section on
burglary—where the breaking and entering statute originally resided.54
While no definitive answer is available to explain why the breaking and
entering statute was omitted from the proposed code, the haste with which the draft
was completed suggests that the omission may have been an oversight. The
completion of the proposal was “a paste-and-scissors job; filling in the uncompleted
portions by wholesale adoption of existing New Mexico provisions or copying of
provisions from other sources. . . .”55 Since the burglary statute included in the
proposed code does not match the existing burglary statute in New Mexico at the
time the proposed code was drafted,56 it seems likely that the burglary section of the
proposed code was simply copied from a jurisdiction that did not have a breaking
and entering statute.

45. See, e.g., 1953 New Mexico Annotated Statutes § 40-10-1 (making it a crime for a person under
18 and “under paternal control” to “absent themselves [from the home] without permission”) (repealed
1963); Fred Buckles, Reception Good to Early Names on List of Jobs, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 23, 1962,
at A-4 (quoting assistant Attorney General Tom Donnelly that “most of New Mexico’s criminal laws were
enacted by territorial legislatures before 1900. . . . [and] are not realistic in present circumstances”).
46. Weihofen, supra note 42 at 123.
47. Id. at 123–24.
48. Id. at 123.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 123–24.
51. Id. at 124.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See 1953 New Mexico Statutes Annotated Vol. 6, Ch. 40, Art. 9 § 40-9-10; H.B 82110, 25th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 1961).
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The hastily-completed proposed code was submitted to the Legislature,
where it was met with political opposition.57 Several portions of the code, in
particular the gun and sodomy laws, were hotly contested.58 As a result, the code was
passed back and forth between the Committee and the Legislature a total of ten
times59 before the new criminal code was enacted in 1963,60 two years after the first
draft was submitted to the Legislature. 61 Despite relatively extensive coverage of the
process by the Albuquerque Journal, the demise of the breaking and entering statute
was never mentioned.62
It is possible that the disappearance of the breaking and entering statute
simply was not noticed by the Legislature, given the attention-grabbing subject
matter of many other changes.63 However, the duration that the code was scrutinized
by the Legislature and legal community, including the State Bar Association, casts
doubt on the idea that breaking and entering was left out as a legislative oversight. It
is unlikely, albeit possible, that no one realized that the breaking and entering statute
was missing over the course of two years. Conversely, it seems more likely that the
Legislature believed that the burglary and criminal trespass statutes rendered the
breaking and entering statute superfluous.64
Thus, the new criminal code stood in place, its lack of a breaking and
entering statute seemingly un-criticized, 65 until the case of State v. Ruiz. Defendant
Ruiz was convicted of criminal trespass and burglary in 1979.66 This conviction was
reversed by the Court of Appeals and the case was remanded for a new trial, to

57. See New Criminal Code Approved by House Over Stiff Protests, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 31, 1961,
at A-1; Criminal Code Expected to Die in Senate Unit, ALBUQUERQUE J., Mar. 5, 1961, at C-11.
58. Criminal Code Failed, ALBUQUERQUE J., Mar. 13, 1961, at A-11 (noting that “[c]hief objections
centered on liberalized provisions on morals offenses”); Law Study Body Opposes Debated Code Sections,
ALBUQUERQUE J., July 15, 1961, at A-7; Fred Buckles, Major Measures Already Face Legislature,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 13, 1963, at A-4 (surmising that the new criminal code “is accorded a favorable
chance of becoming law” now that “a controversy with gun lovers” has been “smoothed over”).
59. City’s Criminal Code to be Aired at Public Hearing, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 4, 1962, at A-1.
60. Criminal Code Bill Signed by Campbell, supra note 41, at A-2.
61. Weihofen, supra note 42, at 123 (stating that the proposed code was “submitted to the 1961
session of the legislature”).
62. See Wayne S. Scott, Word ‘Punishment’ is Used Just One Time in Proposed Criminal Code Being
Studied, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 29, 1961, at B-8; Legislature OK’d Four Interim Study Groups,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Mar. 17, 1961, at C-10; Group Studying Criminal Code Begins 5th Year,
ALBUQUERQUE J., May 7, 1961, at C-16; Proposed State Criminal Code Revision Ended, ALBUQUERQUE
J., Nov. 11, 1962, at B-12; Wayne S. Scott, Proposed Crime Code Gets Added Mauling, ALBUQUERQUE
J., Jan. 24, 1963, at B-2; Criminal Code Adoption Seen, ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 12, 1963, at D-5.
63. See, e.g., Criminal Code Failed, supra note 58, at A-11 (noting that “[c]hief objections centered
on liberalized provisions on morals offenses”).
64. UJI 14-1410 NMRA (N.M. Rules Ann., Committee Commentary) (suggesting that “[p]erhaps
[the Legislature] surmised that if the crime committed did not meet all of the requirements of burglary
(e.g., no intent to commit a felony or theft), then the criminal trespass statute . . . would be an adequate
offense to charge”).
65. A search of the Albuquerque Journal archives from 1964 to 1981 received no results for
“breaking and entering.”
66. State v. Ruiz, 1980-NMCA-123, ¶ 1, 617 P.2d 160.
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include evidence that the defendant lacked the specific intent required for conviction
under the burglary and criminal trespass statutes.67
Ruiz’s intent was in question because he admitted to smoking marijuana
laced with phencyclidine (PCP) and to snorting PCP in the hours before the events
in question.68 The evidence indicated that Ruiz broke into a home and stole
miscellaneous items at some point after taking the drugs.69 When the homeowner
returned home, he realized that his house had been burglarized.70 Upon walking
outside, he found Ruiz unconscious in a nearby yard, surrounded by the stolen
items.71 The police were called, and Ruiz was transported to the hospital.72 The Court
of Appeals later ruled that hospital records be admitted into evidence to support
Ruiz’s defense that he was mentally incapacitated at the time of the alleged crime
and thus unable to form the requisite intent for burglary and criminal trespass.73
The commentary to the Uniform Jury Instructions (UJI) suggests that the
Ruiz case compelled the Legislature to re-enact the breaking and entering statute.74
Seven months after the Court of Appeals remanded the case for retrial, the
Legislature passed an act instituting a new breaking and entering statute and revising
the criminal trespass statute to remove the requirement of specific intent.75 In the act,
the revised criminal trespass statute was earmarked to take the place of the existing
criminal trespass statute under Article 14 of the criminal code, and the new breaking
and entering statute was tacked on underneath the criminal trespass statute with no
additional instructions.76 The new, and current, breaking and entering statute reads
as follows:
(A) Breaking and entering consists of any unauthorized entry of
any vehicle, watercraft, aircraft, dwelling or other structure,
movable or immovable, where entry is obtained by fraud or
deception, or by the breaking or dismantling of any device used to
secure the vehicle, watercraft, aircraft, dwelling or other structure.
(B) Whoever commits breaking and entering is guilty of a fourth
degree felony.77

67. Id.; see generally State v. Gonzales, 1971-NMCA-007, ¶ 25, 482 P.2d 252 (holding that
“[i]ntoxication may be shown to negative the existence of the required intent”).
68. Ruiz, 1980-NMCA-123, ¶ 9.
69. Id. ¶ 9.
70. Id. ¶ 3.
71. Id.
72. Id. ¶ 4.
73. Id. ¶¶ 22–23.
74. UJI § 14-1410 NMRA (Committee Commentary) (stating that “the 1980 case, State v. Ruiz . . .
pointed out the need for a law making it an offense to break and enter where there is no intent to commit
a felony or theft, or where, because of some impairment, it was impossible for the defendant to form the
requisite intent to commit a felony or theft”).
75. Act of Mar. 20, 1981, ch. 34, New Mexico Laws of 1981, 114.
76. Id. This fact may explain the anomaly noted by the Court of Appeals in Holt: breaking and
entering, which one would expect to find with burglary in Article 16, is instead located with trespassing
in Article 14.
77. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-14-8 (West 2016) (emphasis added).
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Like New Mexico’s original breaking and entering statute, the new breaking
and entering statute requires only general criminal intent. Unlike the original,
however, the new statute establishes breaking and entering as a felony offense rather
than a misdemeanor.
The upgrade to felony status may have been because the new criminal code
brought with it a new classification system for criminal offenses. Prior to 1963,
offenses were categorized as either felonies or misdemeanors.78 Now, felonies are
classified by degrees reflecting the severity of the offense and the corresponding
punishment.79 Misdemeanor offenses have also been subdivided, into misdemeanors
and petty misdemeanors.80
When the only options were felony and misdemeanor, it made sense that a
simple breaking and entering did not warrant felony classification, as that category
encompassed the most serious and severe crimes.81 However, in the new system,
breaking and entering could be treated more seriously than a mere misdemeanor, but
also differentiated from more severe crimes by way of degree. Felony classification
also ensured that an attempted breaking and entering could be prosecuted, as
attempted misdemeanor crimes are not.82
The Commentary to the UJI indicates that the legislative intent behind
enacting the new breaking and entering statute was specifically to address fact
patterns like the one in Ruiz: instances in which the target offense of burglary was
completed, but the defendant could potentially escape the reach of the burglary
statute by virtue of intoxication or otherwise failing to form the mens rea required
for conviction.83 However, the Court’s decision to broaden the definition of entry in
State v. Holt extends the reach of the breaking and entering statute beyond this group
of defendants.
The Present-Day Application of the Breaking and Entering Statute: State v.
Holt
One December afternoon, while relaxing in her living room, Carolyn
Stamper heard her doorbell ring.84 She went to the door and peered through the
peephole, but didn’t see anyone.85 Shortly thereafter, she was alerted to the presence
of a man at her living room window by the sound of “metal on metal.”86 She
approached the window and looked out—straight into the face of Anthony Holt, who
was wrestling with her window screen.87 He had partially dislodged it and had his
fingers folded around the bottom of the screen.88 Holt, distracted by the work of
78. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-2 (1953) (repealed 1963).
79. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-1-5 to -7 (West 2016).
80. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-5 (West 2016).
81. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-24-4 (1953) (defining first degree murder, a felony offense)
(repealed 1963).
82. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-28-1 (West 2016).
83. UJI 14-1410 NMRA (Committee Commentary).
84. State v. Holt, 2015-NMCA-073, ¶ 1, 352 P.3d 702 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
85. Id. ¶ 2.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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twisting and turning the screen in an effort to remove it completely, did not notice
Stamper at first.89 When he looked up and saw her, he said, “Oh, I’m sorry,”90 and
then turned and fled.91
Holt was convicted of breaking and entering by the District Court in Doña
Ana County, New Mexico.92 He appealed the conviction to the Court of Appeals,
where it was upheld by a majority decision.93 The court reasoned that the breaking
and entering statute applies to entry into the space between the screen and the
window because that space was enclosed and “a reasonable person would expect the
window screen here to afford some protection from unauthorized intrusions.”94 Holt
again appealed, and the case was heard by the New Mexico Supreme Court.95 The
Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, agreeing that window screens can be
reasonably expected to provide protection from intrusions, and holding that an entry
“occurs whenever there is an invasion into an enclosed, private, prohibited space.”96
Holt’s conviction under the breaking and entering statute was upheld.97
PART TWO: THE EFFECT OF STATE V. HOLT ON BREAKING AND
ENTERING
Changing Attempted Breaking and Entering from a Misdemeanor to a Felony
State v. Holt is, on its face, a case of attempted breaking and entering. Not
only did Holt never ‘set foot’ inside the home, but no part of his body ever actually
entered the interior space of the home. At the point when he was confronted by
Stamper, Holt was still in the process of trying—attempting—to enter the home. And
yet, he was convicted of breaking and entering rather than attempted breaking and
entering.
The distinction between breaking and entering and attempted breaking and
entering is meaningful because the New Mexico Legislature created the two as
separate offenses, with different punishments. The criminal code in New Mexico
allows for uncompleted felonies to be charged as attempts of the intended, or ‘target,’
offense.98 The level at which an attempt is punished is determined by the target
offense’s felony classification.99 Attempted fourth degree felonies, like breaking and
entering,100 are punished as misdemeanors.101
Holt’s attempt to remove Stamper’s window screen in order to enter her
home seems to speak for itself; indeed, it is difficult to describe his actions without
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
State v. Holt, 2015-NMCA-073, 352 P.3d 702.
Id. ¶ 25.
Id. ¶ 20.
State v. Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, 368 P.3d 409.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 1.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-28-1 (West 2016).
Id.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-14-8 (West 2016).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-28-1 (West 2016).
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using the word “attempt,” or a synonym. But what constitutes an “attempt” is
governed by a common law legal theory that breaks the attempted completion of a
target offense down into six steps.102 This theory is quoted here from Hall’s General
Principles of Criminal Law, but predates the book’s initial publication by decades.103
Each of the six stages builds upon the preceding stage. The first is
“conceiving the idea of committing a legally proscribed harm,” followed by
“deliberation,” the point at which a person contemplates how a crime could be
committed, but has not yet decided to commit the crime.104 At the third stage, the
mens rea—the mental intent to commit the crime—is formed.105 Preparation to
commit the crime is the fourth stage.106 The fifth stage is “attempt stopped before the
necessary conduct was completed.”107 The sixth, and final, stage is “completion of
that conduct, with or without attainment of the end sought.”108 Any act at the fifth
stage be classified and punished as an attempt of the target offense, as can any act at
the sixth stage (provided that completion of the target offense eluded the actor).109
While extensive discussion in the legal realm has focused on how much
preparation is necessary to constitute an attempt,110 the line between attempt and the
completed offense has garnered less debate. However, that line is what is at issue in
State v. Holt. By broadening the definition of entry, the Court redefined “the
necessary conduct” that, once completed, elevates an attempt to a completed
breaking and entering. In doing so, the Court took an offense that would have
previously been a misdemeanor crime and turned it into a fourth degree felony.
Fourth-degree felonies are the lowest classification of felonies,111 and
generally carry the lightest sentences.112 Nevertheless, they are still felonies, and
result in the ensuing loss of rights and imprisonment.113 A look at other crimes
classified as fourth degree felonies lends an idea of the severity of the offenses
intended to be punished by the legislature. Other fourth degree felonies include
involuntary manslaughter,114 aggravated assault,115 and false imprisonment.116 It is

102. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 576, 576 (2d ed. 1960).
103. Id. at 576 n.85 (2d ed. 1960).
104. Id. at 576.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id. At this stage, the completed conduct may be the achieved target offense, or may still be only
an attempt of the target offense (if, for example, the bullet fired has missed its intended target).
109. Id. at 577.
110. See HALL, supra note 102 at 576–86; Edwin R. Keedy, Criminal Attempts at Common Law, 102
U. PA. L. REV. 464, 471–72 (1954).
111. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-7 (West 2016) (classifying felonies).
112. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-15 (West 2013) (providing the basic sentence for each level of felony
offense).
113. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-13-1 (West 2013) (making it illegal for persons convicted of a felony to
vote until sentence is completed); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-16 (West 2016) (making it illegal for persons
convicted of a felony to “receive, transport or possess any firearm or destructive device in this state” until
ten years after sentence is completed).
114. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-3(B) (West 2016).
115. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-2 (West 2016).
116. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-4-3 (West 2016).
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crimes of this caliber that the Legislature deemed grave enough to warrant
imprisonment and loss of rights, and thus categorized as felonies. Given the severity
of the consequences of a felony offense, it is imperative to ensure that actions like
Holt’s were the kind of actions the Legislature intended to include within the reach
of the breaking and entering statute.
When the criminal code and the breaking and entering statute were both
first adopted, the legal understanding of entry in New Mexico more closely
resembled the colloquial understanding of entry. The breach of an external boundary
was insufficient to constitute an entry into a structure.117 An ‘actual’ entry, however
small, was required for entry to be proven.118 In light of this definition of entry, Holt’s
actions likely would not have been considered “entry” at the time the Legislature
enacted the breaking and entering statute—meaning that his actions were not those
intended to be punished by the statute.
An attempt to break and enter can only be defined as occurring when an
individual takes an action to enable him or her to enter a space, but ultimately fails
to actually enter that space. Thus, Holt’s thwarted attempt to remove the window
screen was likely the sort of “attempt” to break and enter that the Legislature
intended to address as a misdemeanor. If so, the definition of entry introduced in
Holt, which treats this attempt as the completed felony offense, would therefore be
contrary to the original legislative intent of the breaking and entering statute.
The Policy Argument Behind the Expansion of “Entry”
The creation and classification of criminal offenses has traditionally been
the job of the Legislature, as has been reiterated by the New Mexico Supreme
Court.119 However, in State v. Holt, the Court focused on the policy considerations
underlying breaking and entering to determine whether Holt’s attempt to enter had
gone far enough to warrant treating the attempt as the completed offense.
In State v. Holt, the Court stated that “New Mexico’s breaking-and-entering
statute is itself grounded in common law burglary.”120 Therefore, the Court looked
to the policy purposes behind the burglary statute to determine the purposes
underlying the breaking and entering statute.121 There are many policy considerations
behind burglary at the common law. Most frequently cited are the physical protection
of the home and its occupants,122 the avoidance of a potentially violent confrontation

117. See State v. Grubaugh, 1950-NMSC-044, 221 P.2d 1055 (holding that the opening of a door by
two inches was insufficient to constitute entry).
118. See State v. Tixier, 1976-NMCA-054, 551 P.2d 987 (determining that a half-inch penetration into
the interior space was sufficient to constitute entry).
119. State v. Office of the Public Defender ex rel. Muqqddin, 2012-NMSC-029, ¶ 52, 285 P.3d 622
(“It is for the Legislature, not the courts and not the district attorney, to strike the delicate balance between
those grave crimes punishable as felonies and those lesser infractions punishable as only misdemeanors.”).
120. State v. Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, ¶ 15, 368 P.3d 409 (quoting State v. Rubio, 1999-NMCA-018, ¶
13, 973 P.2d 256).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Muqqddin, 2012-NMSC-029, ¶ 34.
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between the occupants and the intruder,123 and the preservation of the occupants’
sense of safety and security.124
There is little in the facts of Holt to suggest that expanding the definition of
entry to include breaches of external boundaries would promote the physical
protection of the home and its occupants. While the window screen was “pretty much
destroyed,”125 a window screen is easily and inexpensively replaced, and no other
harm was done to the property. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine that any more
significant harm could come from any other mere breach of an external boundary.
The cognizable harms (damaged screens, doors, railings, gates, etc.) pale in
comparison to the harms to the home and the occupants that the breaking and
entering statute seeks to prevent: personal property loss and physical harm to the
occupants.
On the other hand, Stamper’s confrontation with Holt and her resulting
distress speak to the breaking and entering statute’s underlying purposes of
preventing potentially violent confrontations and of protecting the occupants’
feelings of safety and security. In Holt, the homeowner’s confrontation with the
defendant was not violent, but it certainly had the potential to turn violent. Future
encounters between intruders who have merely breached an external boundary and
the occupants of the inner space also have the potential to be violent. Not every
interrupted intruder apologizes or flees.126
Additionally, the experience of even a non-violent confrontation is
frightening to the occupants and disturbing to the occupants’ sense of safety and
security within the home. Stamper’s testimony that she was “frightened” and that she
felt that she had been “confronted in [her] own home” further likened her experience
to the harm sought to be avoided by the breaking and entering statute.127 The Court
concluded that the harms befallen Stamper were the same “invasion of privacy
and . . . feeling of being personally violated” that the burglary statute, and thus the
breaking and entering statute, is intended to redress.128
The Court found that policy concerns regarding privacy and the emotional
impact on the victim justified the expansion of the definition of entry to include any
breach of an external boundary.129 Even when a breach causes no physical harm to
the occupants of the dwelling and results in no violent confrontation, it still results
in an invasion of privacy and the victim feeling personally violated. Since the Court
determined that avoidance of these two results is the crux of the burglary statute, and
thus the breaking and entering statute as well, expanding the definition of “entry”
furthered the purpose of the breaking and entering statute. However, it is still
necessary to examine the expansion of “entry” in light of existing precedent in order
to analyze its impact and practicality moving forward.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See, e.g., U.S. v. Maldonado, 696 F.3d 1095, 1103–04 (10th Cir. 2012).
See, e.g., Muqqddin, 2012-NMSC-029, ¶ 49.
Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, ¶ 3.
Maldonado, 696 F.3d at 1103.
State v. Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, 368 P.3d 409.
Id. (quoting Muqqddin, 2012-NMSC-029, ¶ 41, 285 P.3d 622).
Id.
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Balancing State v. Holt with Precedent for “Entry”
At face value, the expansion of the definition of “entry” appears to run
counter to the Court’s prior decision in State v. Office of Pub. Def. ex rel Muqqddin
regarding the expansion of the burglary statute.130 In Muqqddin, the Court reversed
burglary convictions in two cases where the defendants had accessed a part of a
vehicle that did not give them access to the interior cabin of the vehicle.131 In the first
case, the defendant penetrated a vehicle’s gas tank and was draining the contents
when apprehended.132 In the second case, the defendant removed two of a vehicle’s
tires.133
The Court in Muqqddin distinguished between “the feeling of violation and
vulnerability” one experiences when an intruder is in one’s home, office, or vehicle,
rifling through personal belongings, and the lack of that feeling associated with the
theft of gasoline or tires.134 It held that “the parts are not equal to the whole,” and
thus, “any penetration of a vehicle’s perimeter” is not “a penetration of the vehicle
itself.”135
The facts in Muqqddin parallel the facts in Holt in many ways. While the
feelings of violation and vulnerability are higher when an intruder has breached the
external boundary of a home rather than a vehicle, the intensity of that feeling still
does not reach the level of having one’s personal belongings rifled through by an
intruder. In Muqqddin, the burglary charge against the defendant who stole the tires
was quickly rejected by the Court.136 The Court found that entry in the wheel wells
was not an “entry” for the purpose of a burglary charge.137 The wheel well was an
open space, as opposed to the closed and “protected” space required for burglary in
New Mexico.138
The first intruder’s access to the gas tank, however, is more closely
analogous to the facts of Holt. The puncture of the gas tank left it damaged, as was
the window screen in Holt. The breaking of the external boundary of the tank and
the screen granted defendants Holt and Muqqddin access to a previously protected
space, but not to the actual, inhabitable, interior of the structure. Ultimately, both
defendants had access to “part,” but not the “whole.” Yet, Holt was convicted of
breaking and entering, while Muqqddin’s burglary conviction was dismissed.
There are two key distinctions that may explain why the Court came to
different and seemingly contradictory outcomes in Muqqddin and Holt. First,
Muqqddin involved vehicles while Holt involved a home. The Court highlights the
distinction between vehicles and homes, stating that the feeling of personal violation
was lacking in the Muqqddin cases: the breach of the external boundary of a vehicle

130.
622.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See State v. Office of the Public Defender ex rel. Muqqddin, 2012-NMSC-029, ¶ 50, 285 P.3d
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 43.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id.
Id.
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simply does not evoke the same sense of “violation and vulnerability” as the breach
of the external boundary of a home.139
Second, the defendant in Muqqddin had reached his endgame: he had
accomplished his target offense of siphoning gas from the vehicle’s tank.140 Stealing
the gasoline did not require entry into the cabin of the vehicle, and there is no
indication that the defendant in Muqqddin intended to enter the vehicle.141 His
intention, as implied by his actions, was simply to gain access to the gas tank.
Conversely, in Holt, the defendant intended to enter the house. He wasn’t merely
stealing the screen, which would more closely parallel the actions of Muqqddin and
would likely have had the same outcome of dismissal. Holt’s intention in breaching
the window screen was to go further into the house. The intention to go further into
the house, into the private space of the occupants, further increases the feeling of
personal violation caused by Holt’s breach of the boundary.
The distinctions between a vehicle and a home, and between defendants
who breach an external boundary intending to enter an interior space and those who
intend only to breach the boundary but not to enter the interior space, appear to strike
a balance between the rules established in Holt and Muqqddin. Both rules serve the
same policy purpose of preventing a feeling of personal violation. However, playing
out these distinctions on a larger scale produces some absurd results.
Avoiding Absurd Results in the Application of State v. Holt
The distinction between the breach of an external boundary of a vehicle
versus a home intuitively makes sense. Nevertheless, there is no indication that the
Legislature intended to make this distinction in the breaking and entering statute. The
burglary statute, under which the Court assessed “entry” in Muqqddin, treats homes
differently than vehicles. It provides that the burglary of a home is a higher level
felony than burglary of any other structure, including vehicles.142 The distinguishing
of homes from vehicles in the statute provides a legislative basis for having a
different standard of “entry” for homes. However, the breaking and entering statute
includes no such distinction of homes.143 “Dwellings” and “vehicles” are both
included in the breaking and entering statute with the same amount of gravitas,144
indicating that the Legislature intended for the breaking and entering of homes to be
treated the same as any other structure.
Thus, two different standards of entry are created for vehicles: the “a part is
not equal to the whole” standard for burglary established by Muqqddin,145 and the
“exterior boundary” rule for breaking and entering created by Holt.146 Under the
former, a defendant who breached an exterior boundary but did not reach the interior

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
622.
146.

Id. ¶ 43.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-3 (West 2016).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-14-8 (West 2016).
See id.
State v. Office of the Public Defender ex rel. Muqqddin, 2012-NMSC-029, ¶¶ 36–38, 285 P.3d
State v. Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, ¶ 19, 368 P.3d 409.
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space cannot be convicted of burglary. Under the latter, the same defendant can be
convicted of breaking and entering. This creates an absurd result in which “entry” is
both accomplished and not accomplished, depending on whether the defendant is
charged with burglary or breaking and entering.
The second consideration in balancing Muqqddin and Holt—the distinction
between defendants who intend to enter the interior space and those who intend only
to breach an external boundary—also satisfies the policy purpose behind the burglary
and breaking and entering statutes but produces absurd results. The distinction in
intent is implicit in Muqqddin and goes hand in hand with the Court’s efforts to avoid
absurd results in the Muqqddin cases. To determine that a burglary occurred when
the defendant never breached, nor even intended to breach, the interior space of the
vehicle would be an absurd expansion of the burglary statute. However, applying the
same logic to the facts of Holt demonstrates that this approach of considering the
intention of the defendant potentially negates the “general intent” aspect of the
breaking and entering statute and creates a new defense to breaking and entering.
Breaking and entering, unlike burglary, requires only general intent.147
Thus, when a defendant’s actions fall within the scope of the breaking and entering
statute, it is assumed that the defendant intended to commit the offense of breaking
and entering. Conversely, burglary requires specific intent: the defendant must have
entered the structure “with the intent to commit any felony or theft therein.”148
Specific intent must be proven by the prosecution, while general intent is implied by
the act itself.149 Accordingly, Holt’s action in breaking the window screen and
entering the space between the screen and the window makes him culpable of
breaking and entering. But applying the distinction between intentions made above
in the analysis of Muqqddin, in which the defendants intended only to breach the
external boundary and go no further, a defendant in Holt’s shoes could claim that he
intended only to steal the window screen. Following the example of Muqqddin, a
defendant who claimed to only intend to steal the screen would not being culpable
for breaking and entering, negating the implication of general intent to commit the
crime actually committed. This is an absurd result, and contrary to the history and
concept of “general intent.”150
To avoid these absurd results, as well as the judicial creation of a felony
offense, the Court could adopt a different definition of “entry.” This could be
accomplished most efficiently by adopting the definition of “entry” used by another
state, as that would allow the Court to see how the definition has been applied to real
cases and analyze whether the definition is workable in a variety of circumstances.
PART THREE: ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF ENTRY
The element of “entering” a space for the purposes of a burglary or breaking
and entering statute has been defined variously among the states. Many states have

147.
148.
149.
150.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-14-8 (West 2016).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-3 (West 2016).
See State v. Campos, 1996-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 56-57, 921 P.2d 1266.
Id.
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not yet judicially or legislatively assigned a conclusive definition,151 possibly as a
result of prosecutorial discretion. When prosecutors, with an eye toward the jury box,
rely on a layperson’s common sense understanding of “entry,” they may choose not
to prosecute defendants who failed in their quest to step foot inside another’s home.
Instead, prosecutors may choose to charge those defendants with trespass or an
attempted offense. Without cases being brought in which a defendant is charged with
completed breaking and entering despite no threshold being passed or inhabitable
space being entered, there is little opportunity or reason for judges to set out a
specific definition of entry, and little incentive for legislatures to do so either.
The states that have defined “entry,” either judicially or by legislation, have
taken three divergent paths: defining “entry” as either the penetration of an inner
space, the crossing of a threshold, or the crossing of an external boundary into a
protected inner space. At first reading, these rules all seem to say the same thing. But
in fact, the external boundary rule has far different results than the first two rules,
which typically result in the same conclusion.152 These different results can be
explained through application of the rules themselves.
The first rule, the penetration of an inner space, is the common law
definition of entry. It has been adopted by eighteen states,153 making it the majority
rule in the United States. Most of the states that use the common law rule include in
the rule’s definition that entry can be accomplished by any part of the body or another
instrument.154 Many states also specify that penetration of the inner space by an
instrument only satisfies the element of entry if the instrument was used, or intended
to be used, to commit a crime inside the space (thus ruling out instruments used

151. These states are Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
152. E.g., Hebron v. State, 627 A.2d 1029, 1037–38 (Md. 1993) (using the threshold rule); Perry v.
State 407 So. 2d 183, 185–86 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (making the same inference about entry using the
common law rule).
153. These states are: Alabama (Perry v. State, 407 So. 2d 183, 185 (Ala. Crim. App.1981) (“To
constitute an entry, there must be a penetration of the space within the building by some part of the body
of the defendant, or an accomplice of the defendant, or by an instrument inserted for the purpose of
perpetrating a felony in the building.”)); Alaska (Sears v. State, 713 P.2d 1218 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986));
Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 829(c) (West 2010)); Hawaii (C.f. State v. Faria, 60 P.3d 333, 339
(Haw. 2002) (“[F]or the purposes of the [Unauthorized Entry into Motor Vehicle] statute, ‘entry’ is
defined as the least intrusion into a motor vehicle with the whole physical body, with any part of the body,
or with any instrument appurtenant to the body introduced for the purpose of committing a crime against
a person or against property rights.”)); Illinois (People v. Beauchamp, 904 N.E.2d 1014 (Ill. App. Ct.
2009, rev’d on other grounds, 944 N.E.2d 319); Maine (State v. Crossman, 2002 ME 28, 790 A.2d 603;
Minnesota (Munger v. State, 749 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. 2008)); Missouri (State v. Johnson, 587 S.W.2d 636
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.0145 (West 2015)); New Jersey (State. v.
O’Leary, 107 A.2d 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1954)); New York (People v. King, 463 N.E.2d 601
(N.Y. 1984)); Oregon (State v. Williams, 873 P.2d 471, 473 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (adopting the common
law definition)); Pennsylvania (Commonwealth v. Myers, 297 A.2d 151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972)); Tennessee
(TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-402 (West 2011)); Texas (TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (West 2011));
Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-201 (West 2015)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.52.010
(West 2015)); and Wyoming (Mirich v. State, 593 P.2d 590 (Wyo. 1979)).
154. The definition of entry in Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Missouri, Nevada,
New Jersey, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wyoming all include entry by other instruments.
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solely to commit a breaking—e.g., the rock thrown through a window).155 Regardless
of these differences, the states all take a common sense approach to “inner space”:
the inner space is the space fully inside the dwelling.
The second rule, the threshold rule, often looks very similar to the common
law approach. States that have adopted this rule require that a threshold be crossed
in order for entry to be proven.156 Eight states157 and the District of Columbia158 have
adopted this rule. The results of the threshold rule appear to invariably mimic the
results of the inner space rule, as penetration into the space inside a dwelling
inherently requires the crossing of a threshold.159 The primary benefit of the
threshold rule is that the wording precludes any question of what constitutes “inner
space.” Whether a threshold was passed is a bright line test, with little room for
nuance. Some part of the defendant was either entirely beyond the threshold, or he
was not inside the structure. This makes the threshold rule straightforward and easy
to apply.
The third rule, the crossing of an external boundary into a protected inner
space, has been adopted by New Mexico, as well as four other states.160 Under this
rule, the “protected inner space” is liberally interpreted to include any space beyond
or within an external boundary.
The different result reached by the third rule in some cases is the result of
the third rule’s treatment of the clause “inner space.” While the first two rules
interpret “inner space” in a way more closely resembling the colloquial
understanding of the phrase, the third rule interprets “inner space” more abstractly.
Under the external boundary rule, “inner space” potentially includes any space
protected by a boundary of some sort, regardless whether that space is physically

155. These states are Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey,
Washington, and Wyoming.
156. One of the states included in the “threshold rule” category (Wisconsin) does not explicitly state
that a threshold must be crossed, but instead states that a person must be “within” the structure. Since
being “within” a structure inherently requires the crossing of a threshold, Wisconsin has been included as
a “threshold rule” state.
157. Connecticut (State v. Johnson, 138 A.3d 1108, 1132 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016) (“[L]iability for a
burglary premised on an unlawful entry attaches upon a defendant crossing the threshold.”)); Indiana
(Cupello v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)); Iowa (State v. Pace, 602 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa
1999)); Kentucky (Paulley v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.3d 715 (Ky. 2010)); Louisiana (State v. Smith,
844 So. 2d 119 (La. Ct. App. 2003)); Maryland (Hebron v. State, 627 A.2d 1029 (Md. 1993)); Rhode
Island (State v. Fernandes, 783 A.2d 913 (R.I. 2001)); and Wisconsin (Levesque v. State, 217 N.W.2d
317 (Wis. 1974)).
158. Edelen v. U.S., 560 A.2d 527 (D.C. 1989).
159. E.g., Hebron v. State, 627 A.2d 1029, 1038–39 (Md. 1993) (using the threshold rule); Perry v.
State 407 So. 2d 183, 185–86 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (making the same inference about entry using the
common law rule).
160. Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1501 (2010) (defining entry as an intrusion inside an
external boundary); c.f. State v. Bon, 338 P.3d 989, 993 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that “[th]e sides
of [a] truck bed indicate the external boundary of that part of the vehicle. . . . [a]nd, reaching into the truck
bed amounts to an entry” into the truck for the purpose of burglary)); California (People v. Nible, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding modified by People v. Valencia, 46 P.3d 920 (Cal. 2002)); People
v. Yarbrough, 281 P.3d 68 (Cal. 2012)); Kansas (State v. Carter, 130 P.3d 135 (Kan. 2006)); and
Massachusetts (Commonwealth v. Burke, 467 N.E.2d 846 (Mass. 1984)).
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inhabitable or whether it would traditionally be considered part of the interior of a
structure.
The application of the external boundary rule necessarily requires that the
question of “inner space” be asked and answered in each case, as an “external
boundary” is an ambiguous concept in and of itself. This can be seen in the cases that
have been tried in California, one of the first states to adopt the rule. California
implemented the “external boundary” standard for inner space in a case nearly
identical to State v. Holt.161 After holding that the space behind a window screen is
“inner space,” California courts have struggled to determine which other boundaries
are sufficient to create “inner space.” It has since been decided that the placement of
fingers over the top of a balcony railing is an entry into the attached dwelling,162 that
entry through a gate onto an outdoor stairway was entry into an apartment
building,163 and that placing an ATM card into an ATM was entry into a bank.164
These distinctions are reminiscent of those formerly made in determinations
of “breaking,” which were criticized as “absurd” in the Model Penal Code
Commentary.165 The absurd distinctions regarding “breaking” were resolved by
many states, including New Mexico, by the excision of the breaking element all
together. The same resolution is unavailable for “entering” without voiding burglary
and breaking and entering of all meaning and applicability. Thus, another solution
must be sought to avoid the absurd results associated with “breaking” from becoming
the legacy of “entering” as well.
CONCLUSION
Neither the threshold rule nor the external boundary rule sprung fully
formed from the legislatures of the states that employ them, including New Mexico.
Both rules were the result of a courtroom evolution of the common law rule in
response to the need to define inner space.166 Therefore, a return to the common law
rule would not resolve the issue of whether cases involving the breach of an external
boundary are in violation of the burglary or breaking and entering statutes.
Beyond the common law definition of entry, there is a fork in the road
between the threshold rule and the external boundary rule. The external boundary
rule broadens the range of actions that can be charged as burglary or breaking and
entering, promoting the public policy concerns underlying those statutes. However,
the external boundary rule would likely result in absurd distinctions, as discussed in
parts two and three of this note. These absurd distinctions could be avoided by the
adoption of the threshold rule.
Under the threshold rule, defendants like Holt would not be convicted of
breaking and entering, but could be convicted of attempted breaking and entering, a

161. People v. Nible, 247 Cal. Rptr. 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
162. People v. Yarbrough, 281 P.3d 68 (Cal. 2012).
163. People v. Wise, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 413 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
164. People v. Ravenscroft, 243 Cal. Rptr. 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), overruled by People v. Davis,
958 P.2d 1083 (Cal. 1998).
165. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).
166. See, e.g., People v. Nible, 247 Cal. Rptr. 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding modified by People
v. Valencia, 46 P.3d 920 (Cal. 2002)); Cupello v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
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misdemeanor. This result would support the policy purposes underlying burglary by
punishing the crime committed, while maintaining consistency with both the
legislative intent and the New Mexico Supreme Court’s stance that the categorization
of crimes is the job of the Legislature, not the Court. 167

167. State v. Office of the Public Defender ex rel. Muqqddin, 2012-NMSC-029, ¶ 52, 285 P.3d 622
(“It is for the Legislature, not the courts and not the district attorney, to strike the delicate balance between
those grave crimes punishable as felonies and those lesser infractions punishable as only misdemeanors.”).

